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Abstract
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent
randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to
agents. Although it is well known for its good fair-
ness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof.
In view of this, we address several fundamental
questions regarding equilibria under PS. Firstly, we
show that Nash deviations under the PS rule can
cycle. Despite the possibilities of cycles, we prove
that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to ex-
ist under the PS rule. We then show that verify-
ing whether a given profile is a pure Nash equi-
librium is coNP-complete, and computing a pure
Nash equilibrium is NP-hard. For two agents, we
present a linear-time algorithm to compute a pure
Nash equilibrium which yields the same assign-
ment as the truthful profile. Finally, we conduct ex-
periments to evaluate the quality of the equilibria
that exist under the PS rule, finding that the vast
majority of pure Nash equilibria yield social wel-
fare that is at least that of the truthful profile.
1 Introduction
Resource allocation is a fundamental and widely applicable
area within AI and computer science. When resource alloca-
tion rules are not strategyproof and agents do not have in-
centive to report their preferences truthfully, it is important to
understand the possible manipulations; Nash dynamics; and
the existence and computation of equilibria.
In this paper we consider the probabilistic serial (PS) rule
for the assignment problem. In the assignment problem we
have a possibly unequal number of agents and objects where
the agents express preferences over objects and, based on
these preferences, the objects are allocated to the agents [Aziz
et al., 2014; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Ga¨rdenfors,
1973; Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979]. The model is appli-
cable to many resource allocation and fair division settings
where the objects may be public houses, school seats, course
enrollments, kidneys for transplant, car park spaces, chores,
joint assets, or time slots in schedules. The probabilistic se-
rial (PS) rule is a randomized (or fractional) assignment rule.
A randomized or fractional assignment rule takes the pref-
erences of the agents into account in order to allocate each
agent a fraction of the object. If the objects are indivisible but
allocated in a randomized way, the fraction can also be inter-
preted as the probability of receiving the object. Randomiza-
tion is widespread in resource allocation as it is a natural way
to ensure procedural fairness [Budish et al., 2013].
A prominent randomized assignment rule is the PS
rule [Bogomolnaia and Heo, 2012; Bogomolnaia and Moulin,
2001; Budish et al., 2013; Katta and Sethuraman, 2006;
Kojima, 2009; Yilmaz, 2010; Saban and Sethuraman, 2014].
PS works as follows: each agent expresses a linear order
over the set of houses.1 Each house is considered to have a
divisible probability weight of one. Agents simultaneously
and at the same speed eat the probability weight of their
most preferred house that has not yet been completely eaten.
Once a house has been completely eaten by a subset of the
agents, each of these agents starts eating his next most pre-
ferred house that has not been completely eaten (i.e., they
may “join” other agents already eating a different house or be-
gin eating new houses). The procedure terminates after all the
houses have been completely eaten. The random allocation of
an agent by PS is the amount of each object he has eaten. Al-
though PS was originally defined for the setting where the
number of houses is equal to the number of agents, it can be
used without any modification for any number of houses rel-
ative to the number agents [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001;
Kojima, 2009].
In order to compare random allocations, an agent needs
to consider relations between them. We consider two well-
known relations between random allocation [Schulman and
Vazirani, 2012; Saban and Sethuraman, 2014; Cho, 2012]: (i)
expected utility (EU), and (ii) downward lexicographic (DL).
For EU, an agent prefers an allocation that yields more ex-
pected utility. For DL, an agent prefers an allocation that gives
a higher probability to the most preferred alternative that has
different probabilities in the two allocations. Throughout the
paper, we assume that agents express strict preferences over
houses, i.e., they are not indifferent between any two houses.
The PS rule fares well in terms of fairness and welfare [Bo-
gomolnaia and Heo, 2012; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001;
Budish et al., 2013; Kojima, 2009; Yilmaz, 2010]. It sat-
isfies strong envy-freeness and efficiency with respect to
1We use the term house throughout the paper though we stress
any object could be allocated with these mechanisms.
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the DL relation [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Schulman
and Vazirani, 2012; Kojima, 2009]. Generalizations of the
PS rule have been recommended and applied in many set-
tings [Aziz and Stursberg, 2014; Budish et al., 2013]. The
PS rule also satisfies some desirable incentive properties: if
the number of objects is at most the number of agents, then
PS is DL-strategyproof [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001;
Schulman and Vazirani, 2012]. Another well-established rule,
random serial dictator (RSD), is not envy-free, not as efficient
as PS [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001], and the fractional al-
locations under RSD are #P-complete to compute [Aziz et al.,
2013].
Although PS performs well in terms of fairness and wel-
fare, unlike RSD, it is not strategyproof. Aziz et al. [2015a]
showed that, in the scenario where one agent is strategic,
computing his best response (manipulation) under complete
information of the other agents’ strategies is NP-hard for the
EU relation, but polynomial-time computable for the DL rela-
tion. In this paper, we consider the situation where all agents
are strategic. We especially focus on pure Nash equilibria
(PNE) — reported preferences profiles for which no agent
has an incentive to report a different preference. We exam-
ine the following natural questions for the first time: (i) What
is the nature of best response dynamics under the PS rule?
(ii) Is a (pure) Nash equilibrium always guaranteed to exist?
(iii) How efficiently can a (pure) Nash equilibrium be com-
puted? (iv) What is the difference in quality of the various
equlibria that are possible under the PS rule? In related work,
Ekici and Kesten [2012] showed that when agents are not
truthful, the outcome of PS may not satisfy desirable prop-
erties related to efficiency and envy-freeness. Heo and Man-
junath [2012] provided a necessary and sufficient condition
for implementability of Nash equilibrium for the random as-
signment problem.
Contributions. For the PS rule we show that expected utility
best responses can cycle for any cardinal utilities consistent
with the ordinal preferences. This is significant as Nash dy-
namics in matching theory has been an active area of research,
especially for the stable matching problem [Ackermann et al.,
2011], and the presence of a cycle means that following a se-
quence of best responses is not guaranteed to result in an equi-
librium profile. We then prove that a pure Nash equilibrium
(PNE) is guaranteed to exist for any number of agents and
houses and any utilities. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first proof of the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the
PS rule. For the case of two agents we present a linear-time
algorithm to compute a preference profile that is in PNE with
respect to the original preferences. We show that the general
problem for computing a PNE is NP-hard. Finally, we run a
set of experiments on real and synthetic preference data to
evaluate the welfare achieved by PNE profiles compared to
the welfare achieved under the truthful profile.
2 Preliminaries
An assignment problem (N,H,) consists of a set of agents
N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of houses H = {h1, . . . , hm} and a
preference profile = (1, . . . ,n) in which i denotes a
complete, transitive and strict ordering on H representing the
preferences of agent i over the houses in H . A fractional as-
signment is an (n ×m) matrix [p(i)(hj)]1≤i≤n,1≤j≤m such
that for all i ∈ N , and hj ∈ H , 0 ≤ p(i)(hj) ≤ 1; and
for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ∑i∈N p(i)(hj) = 1. The value
p(i)(hj) is the fraction of house hj that agent i gets. Each row
p(i) = (p(i)(h1), . . . , p(i)(hm)) represents the allocation of
agent i. A fractional assignment can also be interpreted as a
random assignment where p(i)(hj) is the probability of agent
i getting house hj .
Given two random assignments p and q, p(i) DLi q(i) i.e.,
a player i DL (downward lexicographic) prefers allocation
p(i) to q(i) if p(i) 6= q(i) and for the most preferred house h
such that p(i)(h) 6= q(i)(h), we have that p(i)(h) > q(i)(h).
When agents are considered to have cardinal utilities for the
objects, we denote by ui(h) the utility that agent i gets from
house h. We will assume that the total utility of an agent
equals the sum of the utilities that he gets from each of the
houses. Given two random assignments p and q, p(i) EUi
q(i), i.e., a player i EU (expected utility) prefers allocation
p(i) to q(i) if
∑
h∈H ui(h)·p(i)(h) >
∑
h∈H ui(h)·q(i)(h).
Since for all i ∈ N , agent i compares assignment p with as-
signment q only with respect to his allocations p(i) and q(i),
we will sometimes abuse the notation and use p EUi q for
p(i) EUi q(i).
A random assignment rule takes as input an assignment
problem (N,H,) and returns a random assignment which
specifies what fraction or probability of each house is allo-
cated to each agent. We will primarily focus on the expected
utility setting but will comment on and use DL wherever
needed.
The Probabilistic Serial Rule and Equilibria. The Prob-
abilistic Serial (PS) rule is a random assignment algorithm
in which we consider each house as infinitely divisible. At
each point in time, each agent is eating (consuming the prob-
ability mass of) his most preferred house that has not been
completely eaten. Each agent eats at the same unit speed.
Hence all the houses are eaten at time m/n and each agent
receives a total of m/n units of houses. The probability of
house hj being allocated to i is the fraction of house hj
that i has eaten. The PS fractional assignment can be com-
puted in time O(mn). We refer the reader to Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [2001] or Kojima [2009] for alternative defini-
tions of PS. The following example from Bogomolnaia and
Moulin; Aziz et al. [2001; 2015a] shows how PS works.
Example 1 (PS rule). Consider an assignment problem with
the following preference profile.
1: h1, h2, h3
2: h2, h1, h3
3: h2, h3, h1
Agents 2 and 3 start eating h2 simultaneously whereas agent
1 eats h1. When 2 and 3 finish h2, agent 3 has only eaten half
of h1. The timing of the eating can be seen below.
0 1
2Time
13
4
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
h1
h2
h2
h1
h1
h3
h3
h3
h3
The final allocation computed by PS is
PS(1,2,3) =
(
3/4 0 1/4
1/4 1/2 1/4
0 1/2 1/2
)
.
Consider the assignment problem in Example 1. If agent 1
misreports his preferences as follows: ′1: h2, h1, h3, then
PS(′1,2,3) =
(
1/2 1/3 1/6
1/2 1/3 1/6
0 1/3 2/3
)
.
If we suppose that u1(h1) = 7, u1(h2) = 6, and u1(h3) = 0,
then agent 1 gets more expected utility when he reports ′1.
In the example, the truthful profile is in PNE with respect to
DL preferences but not expected utility.
We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria.
For a preference profile , we denote by (−i,′i) the pref-
erence profile obtained from  by replacing agent i’s prefer-
ence by ′i.
3 Nash Dynamics
When considering Nash equilibria of any setting, one of the
most natural ways of proving that a PNE always exists is to
show that better or best responses do not cycle which implies
that eventually, Nash dynamics terminate at a Nash equilib-
rium profile. Our first result is that DL and EU best responses
can cycle. For EU best responses, this is even the case when
agents have Borda utilities.
Theorem 1. With 2 agents and 5 houses where agents have
Borda utilities, EU best responses can lead to a cycle in the
profile.
Proof. The following 5 step sequence of best responses leads
to a cycle. We use U to denote the matrix of utilities of the
agents over the houses such that U [1, 1] is the utility of agent
1 for house h1. Note that P starts as the truthful reporting in
our example. The initial preferences and utilities of the agents
are:
1: h2, h3, h5, h4, h1
2: h5, h3, h4, h1, h2
U0 =
(
0 4 3 1 2
1 0 3 2 4
)
.
This yields the following allocation and utilities at the start:
PS(1,2) =
(
1/2 1 1/2 1/2 0
1/2 0 1/2 1/2 1
)
, EU0 =
(
6
7
)
.
In Step 1, agent 1 deviates to increase his utility. He reports
the preference ′1: h3, h4, h2, h1, h5; which results in
PS(′1,2) =
(
0 1 1 1/2 0
1 0 0 1/2 1
)
, EU1 =
(
7.5
6
)
.
In Step 2, agent 2 changes his report to′2: h3, h4, h5, h1, h2.
This increases his utility to 7 and decreases the utility of agent
1 to 6.
In Step 3, Agent 1 changes his report to ′′1 :
h3, h5, h2, h1, h4. This increases the utility of agent 1 to 7.5
and decreases the utility of agent 2 to 4.5.
In Step 4, Agent 2 changes his report to ′′2 :
h5, h3, h4, h1, h2. which increases his expected utility to 6.5
while decreasing the expected utility of agent 1 to 7.
In Step 5, Agent 1 changes his report to ′′′1 :
h3, h4, h2, h1, h5. Notice that ′′′1 =′1 and ′′2=2. This is
the same profile as the one of Step 1, so we have cycled.
It can be verified that every response in this example is both
an EU best response (with respect to any cardinal utilities
consistent with the ordinal preferences) and also a DL best
response. Hence, DL best responses and EU best responses
(with respect to any cardinal utilities consistent with the ordi-
nal preferences) can cycle.
The fact that best responses can cycle means that simply
following best responses need not result in a PNE. Hence the
normal form game induced by the PS rule is not a potential
game [Monderer and Shapley, 1996]. Checking whether an
instance has a Nash equilibrium appears to be a challenging
problem. The naive method requires going through O(m!n)
profiles, which is super-polynomial even when n = O(1) or
m = O(1).
4 Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria
Although it seems that computing a Nash equilibrium is a
challenging problem (we give hardness results in the next
section), we show that at least one (pure) Nash equilibrium
is guaranteed to exist for any number of houses, any number
of agents, and any preference relation over fractional alloca-
tions.2 The proof relies on showing that the PS rule can be
modelled as a perfect information extensive form game.
Theorem 2. A PNE is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule
for any number of agents and houses, and for any relation
between allocations.
Proof sketch. Consider running PS on all possible m!n pref-
erence profiles for n agents and m objects. In each profile
i, let t1i , . . . , t
ki
i be the ki different time points in the PS al-
gorithm run for the i-th profile when at least one house is
finished. Let g = GCD({tj+1i − tji : j ∈ {1, . . . , ki − 1}, i ∈{1, . . . ,m!n}) where GCD denotes the greatest common di-
visor. Since in each profile i, tj+1i − tji > 0 for all j ∈{0, . . . , ki− 1}, we have that g is finite and greater than zero.
The time interval length g is small enough such that each
run of the PS rule can be considered to have m/g stages of
duration g. Each stage can be viewed as having n sub-stages
so that in each stage, agent i eats g/n units of a house in sub-
stage i of a stage. In each sub-stage only one agent eats g/n
units of the most favoured house that is available. Hence we
now view PS as consisting of a total of mn/g sub-stages and
the agents keep coming in order 1, 2, . . . , n to eat g units of
the most preferred house that is still available. If an agent eats
g units of a house in a stage then it will eat g units of the same
house in his sub-stage of the next stage as long as the house
2We already know from Nash’s original result that a mixed Nash
equilibrium exists for any game.
has not been fully eaten. Consider a perfect information ex-
tensive form game tree. For a fixed reported preference pro-
file, the PS rule unravels accordingly along a path starting at
the root and ending at a leaf. Each level of the tree represents
a sub-stage in which a certain agent has his turn to eat g units
of his most preferred available house. Note that there is a one-
to-one correspondence between the paths in the tree and the
ways the PS algorithm can be implemented, depending on the
reported preference.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is guaranteed
to exist for such a game via backward induction: starting from
the leaves and moving towards the root of the tree, the agent
at the specific node chooses an action that maximizes his util-
ity given the actions determined for the children of the node.
The SNPE identifies at least one such path from a leaf to the
root of the game. The path can be used to read out the most
preferred house of each agent at each point. The information
provided is sufficient to construct a preference profile that is
in Nash equilibrium. Those houses that an agent did not eat
at all can conveniently be placed at the end of the preference
list. Such a preference profile is in Nash equilibrium.
5 Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibrium
Our argument for the existence of a Nash equilibrium is con-
structive. However, naively constructing the extensive form
game and then computing a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium requires exponential space and time. It is unclear
whether a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium or any Nash
equilibrium preference profile can be computed in polyno-
mial time.
5.1 General Complexity Results
In this section, we show that computing a PNE is NP-hard
and verifying whether a profile is a PNE is coNP-complete.
Recently it was shown that computing an expected utility best
response is NP-hard [Aziz et al., 2015b; Aziz et al., 2015a].
Since equilibria and best responses are somewhat similar, one
would expect that problems related to equilibria under PS are
also hard. However, there is no general reduction from best
response to equilibria computation or verification. In view of
this, we prove results regarding PNE by closely analyzing the
reduction in [Aziz et al., 2015b]. First, we show that checking
whether a given preference profile is in PNE under the PS rule
is coNP-complete.
Theorem 3. Given agents’ utilities, checking whether a given
preference profile is in PNE under the PS rule is coNP-
complete.
Proof sketch. Consider the reduction from 3SAT to an as-
signment setting from [Aziz et al., 2015b; Aziz et al., 2015a].
We show that checking whether the truthful preference profile
is in PNE is coNP-complete. The problem is in coNP, since a
Nash deviation is a polynomial time checkable No-certificate.
The original reduction considers one manipulator (agent 1)
while the other agents N \ {1} are ‘non-manipulators’. In
the original reduction, the utility functions of agents in N ′ =
N \ {1} are not specified. We specify the utility function of
agents in N ′ as follows: the utility of an agent in N ′ for his
j-th most preferred house is (8n)m−j+1, where n = |N | and
m is the number of houses. These utility functions can be rep-
resented in space that is polynomial in O(n+m). We rely on
2 main observations about the original reduction. First, in the
truthful profile, whenever an agent finishes eating a house all
houses have either been fully allocated or are only at most
half eaten. Second, in the truthful profile every house except
the prize house (the last house that is eaten) is eaten by at least
2 agents. We now show that due to the utility function con-
structed, each agent fromN ′ is compelled to report truthfully.
Assume for contradiction that this is not the case, and let us
consider the earliest house (when running the PS rule) that
some agent i ∈ N ′ starts to eat although he prefers another
available house h. Let k denote the number of agents who eat
a fraction of h under the truthful profile. By reporting truth-
fully, we show that agent i can get 1/n−1/2n2 = 1/4n more
of h than by delaying eating h. Let us consider how much ad-
ditional fraction of h agent i can consume by reporting truth-
fully. If he reports truthfully, he can start eating h earlier and,
in the worst case, he can only start 1/2n time units earlier.
This means that h is consumed earlier by a time of 1/2n if i
reports truthfully. Consider the time interval of length 1/2n
between the time when h is finished when i is truthful about
h and the time h is finished when i delays eating h. In this last
stretch of time interval 1/2n, i gets 1k · 12n of h extra when
he does not report truthfully. Hence by reporting truthfully, i
gets at least 1/n−1/kn2 more of h which is at least 1/4n since
k ≥ 2. Due to the utilities constructed, even if i gets all the
less preferred houses, he cannot make up for the loss in utility
for getting only 1/4n of h.
Now that we have established that the agents in N ′ report
truthfully in a PNE, it follows that the truthful preference pro-
file is in PNE iff the manipulator’s truthful report is his best
EU response. Assuming that the agents in N \ {1} report
truthfully, checking whether the truthful preference is agent
1’s best response was shown to be NP-hard. We have shown
that the agents N ′ report truthfully in a PNE. Hence checking
whether the truthful profile is in PNE is coNP-hard.
Next, we show that computing a PNE with respect to the
underlying utilities of the agents is NP-hard.
Theorem 4. Given agent’s utilities, computing a preference
profile that is in PNE under the PS rule is NP-hard.
Proof. The same argument as above shows that the agents in
N ′ play truthfully in a PNE. Hence, a preference profile is in
PNE iff agent 1 reports his EU best response. It has already
been shown that computing this EU best response is NP-
hard [Aziz et al., 2015b] when the other agents are N \ {1}
and report truthfully. Thus computing a PNE is NP-hard.
5.2 Case of Two Agents
In this section, we consider the case of two agents since many
disputes involve two parties. Since an EU best response can
be computed in linear time for the case of two agents [Aziz et
al., 2015b; Aziz et al., 2015a], it follows that it can be verified
whether a profile is a PNE in polynomial time as well.
We can prove the following theorem for the “threat profile”
whose construction is shown in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 5. Under PS and for two agents, there exists a pref-
erence profile that is in DL-Nash equilibrium and results in
the same assignment as the assignment based on the truthful
preferences. Moreover, it can be computed in linear time.
Proof. The proof is by induction over the length of the con-
structed preference lists. The main idea of the proof is that if
both agents compete for the same house then they do not have
an incentive to delay eating it. If the most preferred houses do
not coincide, then both agents get them with probability one
but will not get them completely if they delay eating them.
The algorithm is described as Algorithm 1.
We now prove that Q1 is a DL best response against Q2
and Q2 is a DL best response against Q1. The proof is by
induction over the length of the preference lists. For the first
elements in the preference listsQ1 andQ2, if the elements co-
incide, then no agent has an incentive to put the element later
in the list since the element is both agents’ most preferred
house. If the maximal elements do not coincide i.e. h 6= h′,
then 1 and 2 get h and h′ respectively with probability one.
However they still need to express these houses as their most
preferred houses because if they don’t, they will not get the
house with probability one. The reason is that h is the next
most preferred house after h′ for agent 2 and h′ is the next
most preferred house after h for agent 1. Agent 1 has no in-
centive to change the position of h′ since h′ is taken by agent
2 completely before agent 1 can eat it. Similarly, agent 2 has
no incentive to change the position of h since h is taken by
agent 1 completely before agent 2 can eat it. Now that the
positions of h and h′ have been completely fixed, we do not
need to consider them and can use induction over Q1 and Q2
where h and h′ are deleted.
The desirable aspect of the threat profile is that since it
results in the same assignment as the assignment based on
the truthful preferences, the resulting assignment satisfies all
the desirable properties of the PS outcome with respect to
the original preferences. Since a DL best response algorithm
is also an EU best response algorithm for the case of two
agents [Aziz et al., 2015a], we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under PS and for 2 agents, there exists a pref-
erence profile that is in Nash equilibrium for any utilities con-
sistent with the ordinal preferences. Moreover it can be com-
puted in linear time.
6 Experiments
We conducted a series of experiments to understand the num-
ber and quality of equilibria that are possible under the PS
rule. For quality, we use the utilitarian social welfare (SW)
function, i.e., the sum of the utilities of the agents. We are
limited by the large search space needed to examine equi-
libria. For instance, for each set of cardinal preferences we
generate, we consider all misreports (m!) for all agents (n)
leaving us with a search space of size m!n for each of the
samples for each combination of parameters. Thus, we only
report results for small numbers of agents and houses in this
section. We generated 300 samples for each combination of
preference model, number of agents, and number of items;
Input: ({1, 2}, H, (1,2))
Output: The “threat profile” (Q1, Q2) where Qi is the preference
list of agent i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
1 Let Pi be the preference list of agent i ∈ {1, 2}
2 Initialise Q1 and Q2 to empty lists.
3 while P1 and P2 are not empty do
4 Let h = first(P1) and h′ = first(P2)
5 Append h to Q1; Append h′ to Q2
6 Delete h and h′ from P1 and P2
7 if h 6= h′ then
8 Append h′ to Q1; Append h to Q2;
9 return (Q1, Q2).
Algorithm 1: Threat profile DL-Nash equilibrium for 2 agents
(which also is an EU-Nash equilibrium) which provides the
same allocation as the truthful profile.
reporting the aggregate statistics for these experiments for 4
agents in Figures 1 and 2. Each individual sample with 4
agents and 4 houses took about 15 minutes to complete using
one core on an Intel Xeon E5405 CPU running at 2.0 GHz
with 4 GB of RAM running Debian 2.6.32. The results for
2 agents and up to 5 houses as well as 3 agents and up to 4
houses are similar.
We used a variety of common statistical models to gen-
erate data (see, e.g., [Mattei, 2011; Mallows, 1957; Lu and
Boutilier, 2011; Berg, 1985]): the Impartial Culture (IC)
model generates all preferences uniformly at random; the Sin-
gle Peaked Impartial Culture (SP-IC) generates all preference
profiles that are single peaked uniformly at random; Mallows
Models (Mallows) is a correlated preference model where the
population is distributed around a reference ranking propor-
tional to the Kendall-Tau distance; Polya-Eggenberger Urn
Models (Urn) creates correlations between the agents, once
a preference order has been randomly selected, it is subse-
quently selected with higher probability. In our experiments
we set the probability that the second order is equivalent to the
first to 0.5. We also used real world data from PREFLIB [Mat-
tei and Walsh, 2013]: AGH Course Selection (ED-00009).
This data consists of students bidding on courses to attend in
the next semester. We sampled students from this data (with
replacement) as the agents after we restricted the preference
profiles to a random set of houses of a specified size.
To compare the different allocations achieved under PS we
need to give each agent not only a preference order but also
a utility for each house. Formally we have, for all i ∈ N
and all hj ∈ H , a value ui(hj) ∈ R. To generate these util-
ities we use what we call the Random model: we uniformly
at random generate a real number between 0 and 1 for each
house. We sort this list in strictly decreasing order, if we can-
not, we generate a new list (we discarded 0 lists in our exper-
iments). We normalize these utilities such that each agent’s
utility sums to a constant value (here, the number of houses)
that is the same for all agents. In prior experiments we found
the Random utility model to be the most manipulable and
admit the worst equilibria. Therefore, we only focus on this
utility model here (over Borda or Exponential utilities) as it
represents, empirically, a worst case. We separate equilibria
into three categories: those where the SW is the same as in
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0.00% 2.13% 4.02%
0.00% 3.41% 8.46%
0.00% 4.53% 4.64%
0.00% 2.96% 5.23%
0.00% 2.82% 2.66%
0.00% 0.18% 5.37%
% of Equlib. with Decreased SW
2 3 4
Number of Houses
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Figure 1: Classification of equilibria in settings consisting of four agents with preferences drawn from the six models over 2 to
4 houses. We can see that the vast majority of the equilibria that were found across all samples had the same social welfare as
the truthful profile. In general, we see there are roughly the same number of equilibria that increase or decrease social welfare.
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Figure 2: (A) The maximum and minimum percentage increase or decrease in social welfare over all 300 samples for each of
the six models with 2 to 4 houses and four agents. We see that the gain of the best profile is, in general, slightly more than the
loss in the worst profile with respect to the truthful profile. (B) The average number of the 4!4 = 331, 776 profiles that are in
equilibria per instance across all combinations of parameters. The more uncorrelated models (IC and SP-IC) admit the highest
number of equilibria.
the truthful profile, those where we have a decrease in SW,
and those where we have an increase in SW. Given the so-
cial welfare of two different profiles, SW1 and SW2, we use
percentage change ( |SW1−SW2|SW1 ·100) to understand the mag-
nitude of this difference.
For all models, for all combinations of 2 to 4 agents and 2
to 5 houses there are, generally, slightly more equilibria that
increase social welfare compared to the truthful profile than
those that decrease it, as illustrated in Figure 1. However,
the vast majority of equilibria have the same social welfare
as the truthful profile, and the best equilibria are, in general,
slightly better than the worst equilibria, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. Hence, if any or all of the agents manipulate, there may
be a loss of SW at equilibria, but there is also the potential
for large gains; and the most common outcome of all these
agents being strategic is that, dynamically, we will wind up
in an equilibria which provides the same SW as the truthful
one. Our main observations are: (i) The vast majority of equi-
libria have social welfare equal to the social welfare in the
truthful profile. (ii) In general, the number of PNE that have
increased social welfare (with respect to the truthful profile) is
slightly more than the number of PNE that have decreased so-
cial welfare. (iii) The maximum increase and decrease in SW
in equilibria compared to the truthful profile was observed to
be under 23% and 18% respectively . (iv) There are very few
profiles that are in equilibria, overall. Profiles with relatively
high degrees of correlation between the preferences (Urn and
AGH 2004) have fewer equilibrium profiles than the less cor-
related models (IC and SP-IC). (v) These trends appear stable
with small numbers of agents and houses. We observed simi-
lar results for all combinations.
7 Conclusions
We conducted a detailed analysis of strategic aspects of the
PS rule including the complexity of computing and verifying
PNE. The fact that PNE are computationally hard to compute
in general may act as a disincentive or barrier to strategic be-
havior. Our experimental results show PS is relatively robust,
in terms of social welfare, even in the presence of strategic
behaviour. Our study leads to a number of new research direc-
tions. It will be interesting to extend our algorithmic results
to the extension of PS for indifferences [Katta and Sethu-
raman, 2006]. Additionally, studying strong Nash equilibria
and a deeper analysis of Nash dynamics are other interesting
directions.
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